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Abstract This paper develops new directions on how in-
dividuals’ use of multiple goals can be incorporated in
econometric models of individual decision-making. We
start by outlining key components of multiple, simulta-
neous goal pursuit and multi-stage choice. Since different
goals are often only partially compatible, such a multiple
goal-based approach implies balancing goals, leading to a
deliberate goal-level choice strategy on the part of the
decision-maker. Accordingly, we introduce a conceptual
framework to classify different aspects of individuals’ de-
cisions in the presence of multiple goals. Based on this
framework, we propose a formalization of individual
decision-making when pursuing multiple goals. We brief-
ly review different previous streams on goal-based deci-
sion-making and how the proposed goal-driven conceptu-
al framework relates to earlier research in discrete choice
models. The framework is illustrated using examples from
different domains, in particular marketing, environmental
economics, transportation, and sociology. Finally, we dis-
cuss identification and modeling needs for goal-based
choice strategies and opportunities for further research.
Keywords Decision-making . Goal-based decisions .
Multi-stage decisions . Choicemodeling . Goal conflict
1 Introduction
Balancing multiple goals in life is a challenge that most of
us are all too familiar with. On any given day, we strive
variously to improve our health, develop our careers, con-
nect more closely to loved ones at home, protect the en-
vironment, enjoy tasty food, and still find rest and peace
within ourselves to reflect on who we are. This is no small
task, and depending on external circumstances and the
cognitive strategies that we employ, our achievement of
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these different goals likely varies over time. An urgent
deadline at work will force us to prioritize career-related
goals, while imposing a strict self-control regime will al-
low us to exercise every day to support our health-related
goals. The different goals we select and how we prioritize
them affect our behavior and the choices that we make [4,
13, 17, 28]. Yet only recently has research begun to ad-
dress the question of how goals can be directly incorpo-
rated in econometric models of individual decision-
making to test theories about goals and improve our un-
derstanding and prediction of individuals’ choices (e.g.,
[35, 53]).1
We illustrate the challenge of combining goal-based
theory and modeling individuals’ choices of alternatives
through an example. Assume a person is choosing a des-
sert to buy for a dinner at home and uses two personal
goals in the selection: avoid gaining weight and indulge in
something tasty. The person might decide to set a thresh-
old on each goal and only include desserts that exceed
both thresholds (e.g., a tasty and healthy tropical fruit
dessert), or the person may choose—for the one special
evening only—to focus exclusively on the goal of tasti-
ness (e.g., a rich chocolate brownie mousse). Note that at
the goal activation level, the person need not yet assign a
unitary value to any dessert alternative, but decides on the
goal strategy level first; that is, from the perspective of
goal pursuit, a strategy can be defined without consider-
ation of specific means (or options) of achieving them.
Now change the framework from attainment of the two
goals to the more traditional choice modeling view of all
possible desserts having a utility value, which is a func-
tion of each dessert’s attributes. Then the model for the
selection would be to choose the dessert with the highest
overall utility value (i.e., comparing tropical fruit to
brownie mousse) without taking into account the higher-
level goal trade-offs. By ignoring the goal-level decision
strategy, researchers, managers, and policy makers would
develop an inaccurate understanding of how the individ-
ual’s decision is made, what might change the individual’s
decision (in terms of context, communications, and alter-
native designs), and hence how healthier outcomes for the
individual could best be promoted.
The aim of this paper is to further developments in this
direction by integrating research on individuals’ simulta-
neous use of multiple goals with current advances in
choice modeling. The theoretical embedding of goal-
based strategies in models of choice is important for a
number of reasons.2 First, choice models that account
for individuals’ goals may lead to better predictions of
consumer behavior. If different goals are (de)activated
by individuals, they may employ different decision strat-
egies, different environmental cues may be important to
them, they may search different information sources, and
ultimately, they may select different alternatives. Thus,
behavioral differences between individuals, or within an
individual at different points in time or contexts, may
depend on the goal-based strategies that they follow.
Second, these models may lead to new insights and ex-
planations of behavior that cannot be accomplished by
simpler models (of either goal activation or choice alone).
For example, goals are also used by individuals to deter-
mine the allocation of scarce (cognitive) decision-making
resources they have to arrive at better choices [60]. In
particular, the difficulty of making a decision due to per-
sonal restrictions (say, cognitive or budgetary limits), ex-
ogenous constraints (e.g., time and monetary limits), and
contextual complexities (e.g., large numbers of alterna-
tives or many aspects) can be addressed through the in-
troduction of multi-layered decision strategies aligned
with goal hierarchies and/or goal priorities. Third, the
new models may lead to new recommendations to man-
agers or policy makers that cannot be uncovered by a
simpler model. In particular, by better understanding dif-
ferences in goal activation, managers and policy makers
who wish to support individuals in making better deci-
sions (e.g., by living healthier lives, planning their fi-
nances better, or selecting between education options)
may be able to develop more effective policies and pro-
vide better assistance. When individuals look for guidance
in achieving better choice outcomes, a purely predictive
model at the level of their current alternative choices is of
limited use in terms of guiding and improving decisions.
In contrast, a goal-oriented model is needed to also un-
derstand what individuals are hoping to achieve and what
goal-based decision strategy they would like to employ to
make their decisions.
Thus, based on workshop deliberations, we believe that the
explicit extension of econometric choice models to include
simultaneous multiple goals will result in three types of ben-
efits compared to extant microeconomic and psychology the-
ories: (1) consumer decision outcomeswill bemore accurately
predicted; (2) enhanced understanding about decision pro-
cesses; and (3) improved insights about consumers, hence
novel policy recommendations. While at this early stage
goal-based choice models are in their infancy, and these
claims are yet to be firmly established, early empirical work
is encouraging that the proposed goal-based extensions to
choice models will deliver on them.
Turning our attention to the remainder of the paper, we next
outline the key components of multiple, simultaneous goal
pursuit and multi-stage choice. Since different goals are often
1 At this stage, we deal with the term Bgoal^ in an informal and colloquial
fashion. We provide a more rigorous definition of the construct in the next
section.
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for constructive suggestions that helped us
in more clearly highlighting these three points.
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only partially compatible, such a multiple goal-based ap-
proach implies balancing goals, leading to a deliberate goal-
level choice strategy on the part of the decision-maker.
Therefore, we introduce a conceptual framework to begin to
classify different aspects of individuals’ decisions in the pres-
ence of multiple goals, with an eye towards tying contextual
and other covariates into predicting goal (de)activation as an
antecedent to eventual choice. This framework allows us to
also propose a useful formalization of individual decision-
making when pursuing multiple goals. Next, we briefly re-
view different previous streams on goal-based decision-mak-
ing. In addition, we review how the proposed goal-driven
conceptual framework relates to earlier research in discrete
choice models. We further illustrate the framework using ex-
amples from different domains, such as marketing, environ-
mental economics, transportation, and sociology. Finally, we
discuss identification and modeling needs that arise from the
question of whether incorporating goal-level choice strategies
can indeed improve the insights and predictive performance of
models of individual choice.
2 Setting the Groundwork for a Goal-Driven Choice
Model
In this section, we present and describe the goal-based model
of choice that the workshop participants evolved towards dur-
ing the course of the Choice Symposium. We do this up front
because this model frames the remainder of the paper and
clarifies that we are ultimately working towards the formula-
tion of choice models that are not simply goal-sensitive, but
are fundamentally goal-driven.3
The psychology literature on goals is vast and long-stand-
ing, as evidenced by the now classic review of Austin and
Vancouver [4]; it has only increased since then (see, e.g.,
[60]). The former authors state: B… the sheer magnitude of
this body of research is associated with a certain danger.
Heterogeneous perspectives can generate a large body of facts,
an excess of vocabulary, and numerous micro theories …^
(see p. 338 in [4]). Thus, before undertaking the task of con-
ceptualizing a choice framework based on goal pursuit, it be-
hooves us to spend some effort defining what we mean by
Bgoals.^ It seems most useful to start by recognizing that
many types of constructs of interest to psychologists and so-
cial scientists might be expressed as, or reflected in, expres-
sions of goals. For example, needs (e.g., hunger, thirst, enter-
tainment) or values (e.g., statements about high-level abstract
personal characteristics that we would like to possess) can be
expressed as goals, by including the construct in a statement
embodying pursuit of a desired end state. Fundamentally,
goals are directive in nature, in that their pursuit will lead to
desirable end states. More effectively, however, a taxonomy
that recognizes that there exist functional goals whose attain-
ment is directly linked to product or service characteristics
seems most useful for our purposes. More abstract (i.e.,
non-functional) goals reflect the existence of a goal hierarchy
that will require a cascading of sub-goals that ultimately leads
to a set of functional goals as they operationalize the abstrac-
tion into ever more specific pursuits. Another distinction with
a practical meaning for our purposes is that goals can be
approach or avoidance goals [4, Table 2], indicating that their
Bvalence^ has a behavioral impact. Finally, we wish to point
out that decision-makers can pursue functional goals (those
they are trying to accomplish through the decision being
made) as well as process goals (those they are attempting to
pursue that have to do with how the decision is being made).
In any particular modeling context, the focal goals may come
frommultiple categories depending upon the problem features
that are of greatest research and substantive interest.
We begin by introducing the notion that a goal-driven
choice requires operating in two separate but related spaces
(see Fig. 1): (1) attribute space (with dimensions x1, x2,…),
where alternatives (z1, z2,…) exist, and (2) goal space (G1,G2,
…), with dimensions determined by the decision-maker. Note
that the standard micro-economics description of decision-
making restricts its attention to attribute space and overlays a
value (or utility) function defined on attributes; the highest
value option is (usually) presumed selected. This depiction
of the choice process also comports the concept of attribute-
based constraints, which leads to the creation of a choice set
ΥX of feasible alternatives (the X subscript refers to the attri-
bute space, as defined above). The generalization of the choice
process from the point of view of goals is depicted in Fig. 1.
Specifically, choice arises from a goal set ΓA ⊆ Γ (BA^ for
activated and with Γ a (currently vaguely defined) notional
super set of goals). The activation of goals results in a defini-
tion of the metrics of success for the choice problem at the
goal level.
In Fig. 1, goals G1, G3, and G4 are activated by the deci-
sion-maker, whereas G2 is not (for example, this could be due
to a lack of relevance to the decision or inability to attain it
with the options presented/available for choice). The double-
headed block arrows between the attribute space and ΓA are
there for the purpose of reminding us that the (de)activation of
goals will be influenced by the attribute space via the alterna-
tives, which in turn may be influenced by the imposition of
attribute-driven constraints reflecting one or more goals (e.g.,
a price limit).
The core of the proposed framework is depicted in the goal-
space diagram. We highlight three important points about this
framework. First, and perhaps foremost, the activation and
pursuit of multiple goals is directly represented in this space,
without appeal to some kind of value function. Second,
3 Van Osselaer and Janiszewski [58] present a framework for goal-based
choice that is motivated by ideas and concerns similar to our own.
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decision-makers can consider goals met or not for different
reasons: one goal may require that a threshold level be met,
whereas another may need to be pursued to best end (i.e.,
optimized). More generally, goals can be constraints and/or
objectives. For example, the figure makes the point that goal
G1 ≥ τ1, which leads to the further elimination of alternatives
z4 and z5 (to remind, z2 was eliminated due to constraint H1 in
attribute space), i.e., the choice set of feasible alternatives in
attribute space, ΥX, can be further refined in goal space to set
ΥG. This need not happen sequentially, and each of these sets
can have unique elements. Third, decision-makers’ choice of
establishing the role of goals, singly and in interaction, is what
we suggest be termed the goal choice strategy. That is, to
make a product choice, the decision-maker must make two
fundamental determinations with respect to goal space: (1)
What are its dimensions (e.g., activate G1, G3, G4, but not
G2) and (2) What constitutes the attainment of each goal
(e.g., maximize G1, set a target on G3, and keep G4 above a
threshold). These decisions are of prime importance because
they reflect the presumption that the decision-maker’s choice
is ultimately determined in goal space, not attribute space, as
commonly represented.
The mechanics of determining the level of attainment of
Gk(z) by an alternative z is what we term the goal evaluation
strategy. The goal evaluation strategy may be a function of
some or all of the attributes that affect the achievement of
alternatives on that goal, and the goal-specific strategy may
differ across goals. For example, the tastiness of a dessert may
be determined by a combination of its sugar and fat contents,
its flavoring, etc.; its healthiness, for a gluten-intolerant indi-
vidual, may be determined simply by whether or not it con-
tains wheat.
Thus, the goal evaluation strategy does not affect the choice
directly but determines how well alternatives perform on each
of the different goals. The goal choice strategy then drives the
choice by combining the impact of the different goal evalua-
tions on choice. A noteworthy point to make here is that the
goal choice strategy is not necessarily a function of anything
involving the lower-level outcomes (not the options, or their
attributes, or the levels of those attributes, or how one uses
those to create a single evaluative scale, such as Butility^).
That is, if one decides to have a healthy dessert, one does
not necessarily first ask about which healthy desserts are
available.
Note that in this formulation, we have employed approach
goals or goals that decision-makers select to achieve or satisfy.
The model could also be formulated with avoidance goals, as
mentioned above, with the corresponding change in algebra.
However, one may also consider behavioral aspects of ap-
proach versus avoidance goals. Heterogeneity may include
x1
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Fig. 1 Framework relating multiple-goal pursuit to choice
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individuals who choose to achieve certain outcomes (healthy
body weights), or avoid outcomes (obesity), or who choose to
achieve personal safety or avoid risky situations. The choice
process outcomes may differ for those who formulate these
goals in the approach mode or avoidance mode, perhaps
somewhat akin to the outcomes arising from framing choices
as gains or losses.
To illustrate these concepts, suppose a decision-maker
might decide on the strategy of compensatory pursuit of goals
G3 and G4 (refer to Fig. 1), using weights that sum to unity,
while requiring thatG1 ≥ τ1 andH1 ≥ d, where τ1 and d are two
known thresholds. The goal choice strategy for two goals G3
and G4 then is the following:
Choose i∈M such that
max
i∈M
ΨM ¼ ∑
i∈M
δ w3G3 X ið Þ þ w4G4 X ið Þð Þ
s:t:
0≤δi≤1∀i∈YX∩YG
δi ¼ 0∀i∉YX∩YG
∑
i∈M
δi ¼ 1
YX ¼ i∈M jH1 X ið Þ≥df g
YG ¼ i∈M jG1 X ið Þ≥τ1f g
ð1Þ
In the goal-based decision problem (1), the objective func-
tion is specified as compensatory; it could just as easily be
defined as some non-compensatory function. For example, if
the strategy were changed to choose the option that disjunc-
tively optimizes either G3 or G4, we simply change the objec-
tive function in program (1) to
max
i∈M
ΨM ¼ ∑
i∈M
δimax G3 X ið Þ;G4 X ið Þð Þ ð2Þ
In our desire to work towards workable operational choice
models of goal-driven behaviors, formalisms of the type rep-
resented by (1) make it possible to envision model specifica-
tions that directly reflect goal constructs. As we see above,
mathematical program (1) is capable of (a) incorporating goals
both as objectives (ΨM) and constraints (YG), (b) handling
multiple-goal pursuit (exemplified here with goals G3 and
G4), and (c) including attribute-space constraints (YX). A de-
cision may also be subject to what one might term Bside^
constraints, which are neither attribute- nor goal-spaced based,
such as a budget constraint. This extension requires the intro-
duction of constraints to (1), such as
∑
i∈M
δipi≤ I ð3Þ
where pi is the (exogenous) price of good i and I is the deci-
sion-maker’s income.
Figure 1 shows one representation that extends our basic
goal-driven decision framework to handle such constraints: if
the preferred option in goal space meets these requirements,
the choice made in goal space is final; if not, it is necessary to
revise goals (e.g., activate or deactivate some goal, change the
relative importance of one goal relative to others), change goal
choice strategy or goal evaluation strategy, introduce or relax
constraints in either attribute or goal space, etc.
An important point about Fig. 1 merits repetition: this
framework is meant to imply that choice is determined in goal
space, not attribute space. The framing of the decision prob-
lem is made in terms of the goals and how they are to be used
to make a choice—i.e., determination of the goal choice strat-
egy; secondarily, how individual goals are Bcalculated^ is
established—i.e., determination of the goal evaluation strate-
gy. Attribute space contributes essential information about
constraints and other relevant information, but it is not where
choice is determined.
3 A Brief Review of Goal-Based Decision Models
3.1 Empirical Models
There is burgeoning empirical and theoretical research on
goal-based choice at the intersection of cognition and brain
sciences, neuroscience, and neuroeconomics, both for individ-
uals making decisions in isolation and in social situations [20].
A recent example of research into functional goals is
Larrick [30] who presents a framework for decisions in social
contexts similar to that considered in the present article. He
introduces BObjectives to achieve with the decision^ (whereas
we conceptualize goals as desired levels of attainment of ob-
jectives) and presents attributes as Bindicators/means of
achieving objectives.^ Another example is Orehek and
Forest [43] who include relationship partners as means to
goals and suggest that satisfying relationships are achieved
when partners experience mutually perceived instrumentali-
ty—that is, each partner feels instrumental to his or her part-
ner’s important goals and simultaneously perceives the partner
as instrumental to their own important goals. This perspective
guides their predictions about how people cope with relation-
ship loss (e.g., due to death of a partner)—individuals with
social networks that can substitute for a lost partner should
find partner loss less devastating. Other related recent work by
Etkin [14] studies variety goals in committed relationships; for
example, when planning a weekend together, one member of a
couple could choose more varied activities (e.g., going out to
dinner, to a movie, and to a concert) or less varied activities
(e.g., going to three different movies). Etkin’s experimental
work shows that when consumers perceive more (respectively
less) future time ahead in a (committed) relationship, they
prefer more (respectively less) variety in joint consumption;
the studies also reveal different choices for solo versus joint
consumption. As the author notes, these results have
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implications for recommendation systems. For example, sup-
pose a couples’ most recent vacation was a Caribbean cruise,
then a good recommendation for a younger relationship would
be a very different trip (e.g., a wine tour) and, for an older
relationship, a similar trip (a cruise to a different place). This
prediction seems to run counter to popular expressions such as
Byou only live once^ and the notion of a Bbucket list^ and
suggests the need for further studies that control for howmuch
variety a couple, and the individuals in the couple, have
achieved to date.
A person’s values are the principles or standards of their
behavior and involve their judgment of what is important in
life; thus, they might be considered to be determinants of their
objectives and/or goals. Kasser [24] assumes that the value of
materialism Breflects the extent to which an individual be-
lieves that it is important to acquire money and possessions,
as well as to strive for the related aims of an appealing image
and high status/popularity, both of which are frequently
expressed via money and possessions^; he presents research
on participants’ ratings of the importance of a variety of goals,
with materialism assessed by calculating the importance of
extrinsic goals for financial success (BI will be financially
successful^), image (BMy image will be one others find
appealing^), and popularity (BI will be admired by many
people^) relative to other goals.
When we look at process goals, a habit leads a person to
repeat the same behavior in a recurring context. Adamowicz
and Swait [1] characterize habits as decision strategies that
minimize cognitive effort, and Wood and Runger [61] charac-
terize them in terms of their cognitive, motivational, and neu-
robiological properties; the latter review summarizes compu-
tational models of habit and deliberate goal pursuit, with habit
the learned efficient default mode of response. The main clas-
ses of models presented are based on (1) artificial neural net-
works with two interlinked habit and goal networks [10]; (2) a
cognitive architecture within the adaptive control of thought-
rational (ACT-R) framework where behavioral control shifts
from an internal, declarative task representation (goal based)
to one based on environment cues (habit based) [54]; and (3)
cognitive neurosciencemodels of reinforcement learning (RL)
where goal-directed learning involves mental simulation and
planning (model-based learning) and habit formation involves
trial-and-error learning to estimate and store long-run values
that are available in different states or contexts (model-free
learning) [18].
Cognitive neuroscience RL models are driven by, and in
turn drive, neuroscientific research using functional neuroim-
aging with human subjects, with the latter providing evidence
on neural systems that integrate habit and goal-directed action
(see Wood and Runger’s section Neurobiology of Habits).
O’Reilly et al. [40] present a computational framework in
which goal-driven behavior is in place from the start, not aris-
ing solely in reaction to the environment as it is typically
conceived in RL models. Their main hypothesis is that there
are two qualitatively different states of mental life: goal selec-
tion where a decision-maker carefully considers the cost and
benefits of possible goals and goal engaged where a decision-
maker has decided to try to achieve one or more goals. They
assume the neural system ismotivated to have at least one goal
engaged, and once a goal is engaged, it dominates the evalu-
ation of options and resists disengagement. The framework is
implemented in a biologically constrained computational al-
gorithm, with the constraints motivated by known features of
relevant brain areas and mechanisms, and can potentially ex-
plain a wide range of clinical disorders. There is extensive
related work in Neuroeconomics, mainly studying brain-
based representation and learning of values; in particular, see
Glimcher and Fehr [20] and the review by Konovalov and
Krajbich [27].
3.2 Normative Models
The analysis of decision-making has received equal attention
from the perspective of prescriptive or normative models.
From the prescriptive perspective, the aim is to develop
models that can support decision-making, rather than to de-
scribe or predict it. In prescriptive approaches, the notion of
goals of the decision-maker plays a central role, as without
knowledge of the decision-maker’s goals it would be impos-
sible to identify what the best decision is in any given decision
problem. Being able to generate a list of the objectives to be
achieved by the decision of concern is an axiomatic assump-
tion of decision analysis that is part of the foundation of the
field as put forward by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [59]
and Savage [47]. As Keeney [25] puts it Bif the set of objec-
tives has not been generated then there is no basis to even
think about which alternativesmay be better thanwhich others
and why this is the case.^ Thus, where one could possibly
disregard goals in descriptive approaches, they constitute the
cornerstone of prescriptive frameworks.
To discuss how the notion of goals has been incorporated in
prescriptive decisionmodels, it is helpful to make a distinction
between two phases in decision-making processes, namely (1)
structuring the decision problem and (2) evaluating the deci-
sion alternatives for making a choice. Decision support
methods generally intend to support both phases. Knowing
one’s goals or objectives is essential to structuring a decision
problem, as goals provide the basis for both identifying deci-
sion alternatives (creating a choice set) and specifying prefer-
ence functions for evaluating the alternatives. Failure to iden-
tify underlying objectives is a well-known pitfall in decision-
making [7]. Developing a goal hierarchy is an example of a
method that is advocated to avoid overlooking essential eval-
uation criteria. In this method, the user creates a goal tree by
iteratively deriving sub-goals from main goals (of the
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organization) until they are operationalized as criteria on
which alternatives can be evaluated [46].
The adoption of goal-based approaches in the choice phase
is less evident in multi-criteria decision analysis. A variety of
approaches have been developed for supporting evaluation
and making a decision. Different standpoints are taken in ap-
proaches with respect to the question whether value can be
represented through a closed-form preference function. Multi-
attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) and Analytical Hierarchy
(AHP) are two mainstream approaches where value is
expressed through a linear additive (closed-form) function of
attributes/criteria. MAUT models assume a utility function
similar to the linear-in-parameters utility functions assumed
in (descriptive) discrete choice models. AHP also uses the idea
of a closed-form evaluation function. However, the approach
to estimating relative values of criteria as well as scores of
alternatives differs (i.e., a geometric mean or eigenvalue meth-
od is used). On the other hand, outranking methods, a third
important category of multi-criteria decision analysis
methods, do not assume a closed-form evaluation function.
Outranking methods emphasize that a complete ranking of
alternatives on the given decision criteria may not be feasible.
Their purpose is to perform an initial screening and produce a
short list that is presented to the decision-maker for a thorough
trade-off [41].
The closed-form evaluation functions as used in MAUT,
AHP, and other approaches generally assume a compensatory
structure. Non-compensatory decision rules, on the other
hand, have also received attention especially in case of deci-
sion problems where the number of decision alternatives is
large or the solution space is not even continuous. In goal
programming, the decision problem is structured by means
of a goal achievement function where a target value is defined
for each goal of the decision at hand and the best solution is
defined as the solution that minimizes the total deviation from
targets across the goals. Although many forms of non-
compensatory decision rules are possible, the lexicographic
rule and the minimax rule are the most commonly used non-
compensatory rules in goal programming [45]. In the case of a
lexicographic rule, no trade-offs are made between goals that
are placed in different priority levels, whereas if a minimax
rule is used, the maximum deviation across goals is minimized
(a solution is as good as the performance on the goal on which
it performs poorest).
To conclude, what evidence do we find for goal thinking in
prescriptive approaches to decision-making? As the above
short review suggests, goal thinking is evident in the decision
problem structuring phase: knowledge of decision-making
goals is considered essential for defining preference or goal-
attainment functions to evaluate alternatives. In MAUT, AHP,
and other approaches that assume linear additive evaluation
functions, goals are less central to the approaches but implic-
itly represented in functions that define performance of
alternatives typically in attribute space. Outranking methods
are more conservative and assume that some trade-offs may be
too complex to be made in such a fashion and leave those to
the decision-maker. Furthermore, in goal-programming ap-
proaches, goal achievement functions assuming more com-
plex trade-offs in goal space are relatively standard.
4 The Proposed Goal-Driven Model of Choice
Relative to Other Discrete Choice Models
In this section, we briefly review the relationship between our
proposed conceptual framework and traditional discrete
choice models and in particular how the latter have been ex-
panded over the years to incorporate various behavioral ef-
fects. We focus on the systematic component of the discrete
choice models. While much research has also addressed ran-
dom error components in models of choice to capture hetero-
geneity in taste (e.g., random coefficient or mixed logit
models, see [37]) or heteroscedasticity between decisions or
individuals (e.g., the generalized multinomial logit model
[16]), in this overview, we are mainly concerned with the
structure of the systematic components in the model that cap-
ture variations in decision processes or decision weights.
The traditional discrete choice model connects alternatives’
attributes and their levels to the underlying latent utility that
consumers derive from these levels ([36]—see Fig. 2).
Alternatives can differ in the attribute levels that they offer
(e.g., consumer products, transport modes, jobs, potential ro-
mantic partners). Individuals evaluate the attractiveness of
these levels and integrate these evaluations into an overall
utility that they attach to each alternative. Individuals’ choices
depend on the overall utility per alternative, and they choose
the alternative with the highest utility subject to their financial
budget and their time constraints.
Fig. 2 Structure of traditional discrete choice models
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Based on insights into behavioral effects in individual de-
cision-making, such as the use of heuristics or evaluation
biases, these traditional discrete choice models have been ex-
panded to also allow for the use of different decision rules. For
example, flexible models have been proposed to capture
whether individuals use conjunctive or disjunctive decision
rules [19, 22]; shifts in decision rules based on the complexity
of the decision task [12, 51]; the use of cutoffs in decisions
[50]; and the impact of regret on decisions [9]. These models
have in common that they augment the traditional discrete
choice model with an additional modeling layer that captures
variations in how different attribute levels are integrated in a
heuristic decision rule that results in an individuals’ choice of
an alternative (see Fig. 3).
Recent work has taken a different angle on extending dis-
crete choice models: instead of focusing on decision heuris-
tics, it has addressed the question what higher-order benefits
consumers look for when making decisions. This research
builds on early work in, e.g., marketing, which highlighted
that consumer needs may vary across situations (e.g., [39])
and that the evaluation of attribute levels may depend on the
degree to which they can help fulfill underlying consumer
needs (e.g., [11, 21, 56]). Researchers have proposed different
models that can capture this intermediate layer in the utility
formation process. Hybrid choice models have been proposed
that flexibly incorporate such intermediate evaluation steps
[6]. These evaluations have been treated as latent (benefit)
variables by some researchers [26, 44], while other re-
searchers have explicitly elicited attribute-benefit connections
from individuals [2]. Thus, in these models, the attributes of
each alternative drive how the alternative is evaluated on each
of a set of different benefits that consumers look for and the
utility that is subsequently attached to the different benefits
determines the consumer choice. Figure 4 summarizes the
structure of this second stream of choice model extensions.
In this article, we propose a different approach to the de-
velopment and motivation of discrete choice models that is
conceptually related to benefit-based discrete choice models
but is also fundamentally different in that it explicitly ac-
knowledges that individuals may also form decision strategies
at the level of the goals they pursue. More precisely, we view a
goal as conceptually similar to an individual’s desire to
achieve a certain benefit (e.g., an individual’s goal of eating
healthily aligns with looking for the benefit Bhealthy^ in food;
an individual’s goal of saving effort aligns with looking for the
benefit Bconvenience^ in transportation; etc.). However, we
propose that achieving goals is not a neutral process that trans-
lates directly to utility (such as in the benefit-based models),
but that much as in the case of heuristics and attribute-level
evaluations, individuals may choose to follow a certain goal
strategy to come to a choice. For example, they may focus on
one goal at the expense of all others, or they may balance
different goals when making a decision. Thus, in evaluating
alternatives, individuals follow a two-step approach, for which
the order of cognitive processing may vary. Step 1 is the goal
evaluation strategy in which alternatives are evaluated in
terms of how well they perform in achieving a certain goal
(e.g., are Brussel sprouts healthy? are they tasty?). Step 2 is the
goal choice strategy, in which the individual determines how
to integrate the fulfillment of different goals into the selection
of an alternative (e.g., focus exclusively on health outcomes of
food or balance healthiness against tastiness). This proposed
structure is graphically summarized in Fig. 5 and was formal-
ized in the proposed conceptual model at the start of this paper.
5 Applications in Different Fields
5.1 Marketing
As an example from marketing on the impact of goal choice
strategies, consider the case of a consumer’s choice of a new
home. Multiple (often competing) goals are likely activated
Fig. 4 Structure of benefit-based discrete choice models
Fig. 3 Structure of behavioral discrete choice models that allow for
decision heuristics
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when someone is choosing a new home, and activated goals
will constrain the feasible attribute space. For example, a de-
sire to achieve or maintain financial security creates a home
price ceiling (i.e., rent, mortgage), while other competing
goals such as achieving social status or having well-
educated and accomplished children translate into a price min-
imum threshold and neighborhood location constraints (e.g.,
acceptable school districts). Awork-family balance goal may
further constrain neighborhood location (i.e., commute time)
as well as property size and condition (i.e., required mainte-
nance and repair time). Household budget constraints limit the
feasible attribute space and goal space, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
especially for low- and middle-income households, and goal
importance/activation is likely to be updated as the choice
process progresses. Heterogeneity in the relative importance,
or activation, of each goal will manifest in different decision
strategies across a cross section of consumers. Similarly, we
expect to observe heterogeneity within households for repeat-
ed home choices over time as the relative importance of each
goal evolves over the lifetime of the decision-maker.
5.2 Environmental Public Policy
Two examples of areas in environmental economics that em-
ploymodels of choice and in which goal choice strategies may
be impactful are recreation demand models (intended to cap-
ture the behavior associated with recreation site choice and
measure values arising from changes in environmental attri-
butes) and models of passive use value (intended to capture
monetary values for changes in public goods or publically
provided goods). In both of these cases, multiple goals may
play a significant role in decision-making. In the recreation
context, goals may include fitness, socializing, desire for sol-
itude, developing skills (e.g., rock climbing or birdwatching),
passing on traditions to children (e.g., hunting or fishing
skills), or expanding experiences (e.g., life lists for
birdwatchers). These goals may compete with each other
and may differ across social contexts (family trips versus trips
with colleagues). Morey and Thiene [38] examine such recre-
ational choices in the context of Blife constraints,^ but this
approach can be re-considered in a goal-based framework.
In the elicitation of passive use values, which is typically
framed as a referendum between policy options, there is a long
history of discussion of the competing goals of being a
Bcitizen^ (altruistic, socially minded) versus a Bconsumer^
(rational self-interested individual). These different goals have
been examined empirically [5], and conceptual models have
been developed to reflect these goals and the factors that affect
the balance between them. Levitt and List’s [31, 32] model
that outlines conflict between moral/ethical goals and personal
wealth goals has been used as a framework to understand
choices in passive use value (as well as other) contexts.
5.3 Transport
The role of goals in transport choice has been studied in the
context of sustainable transportation mode choice. Individuals
who cherish feelings of power and pleasure (power and he-
donic goals) put a high relevance on owning their own trans-
port mode, which positively affects their choice of using their
private car for trips [44]. Individuals who are interested in
pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself right now (he-
donic and egoistic goals) are more likely to use the automobile
instead of adopting pro-environmental behaviors [49].
Competing goals may also be activated in particular situa-
tions. For example, in choosing the type of car to buy, a goal of
behaving in an environmentally friendly manner which would
lead, say, to the choice of an electric vehicle can compete with
a goal of achieving social status, which might lead towards the
choice of a luxury car. Since luxury electric vehicles are ex-
tremely expensive, achieving both goals might be limited by
the individual’s budget constraint. Individuals’ final choices
will depend then on their goal choice strategy and how each
alternative is evaluated on the different goals (i.e., goal eval-
uation strategy).
5.4 Sociology
As an example in the domain of sociology, multiple, poten-
tially competing goals are likely activated when searching for
a romantic relationship. For example, a woman seeking a
marriage partner might restrict her search to men who are
financially secure to increase her own financial security as
well [42]. But the pool of financially secure men tends to be
older than the general population; pursuit of this goal would
increase her likelihood of ending up with someone much older
and previously married, which could conflict with the goal of
having a conventional (non-blended) family arrangement.
Fig. 5 Structure of goal-based discrete choice models
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Moreover, a woman in the dating market may have multiple
goals that span very different time horizons, constraining the
attribute space. For example, she might eventually wish to be
married, but in the short term wants to have fun and explore
her options. In selecting a goal choice strategy, she must de-
cide how much effort to allocate to achieving these two goals,
and this in turn may imply very different subsets of the attri-
bute space that she will consider. Different mate seekers may
allocate different levels of effort to these two goals, resulting
in heterogeneous goal choice strategies.
It is interesting to note that, while goals constrain at-
tribute space, attribute space may also constrain the em-
phasis put on certain goals and hence the goal choice
strategy. For example, the local dating pool is a major
constraint that limits feasible attribute space, as it deter-
mines who is available to mate seekers. What goals are
activated may also depend on some overall evaluation of
the set of available options—i.e., whether the total avail-
able set is deemed overall desirable or undesirable (e.g.,
[34]). When desirable options are thin on the ground, a
mate seeker may abandon the goal of finding a long-term
partner and instead focus on pursuing more short-term
encounters. Thus, in the presence of multiple goals, if
one goal constrains attribute space too much, the
decision-maker may shift her focus to goals where she is
more likely to succeed.
5.5 Specific Examples of Implementation
To focus the applications further, we present two recent exam-
ples of the application of such steps towards goal-based re-
search. They are Swait et al. ([52] based on Li [33]) and Souza
[48]. The former developed an econometric model for latent
(functional) goal identification using traditional stated prefer-
ence (SP) data. Apropos the issue of validation, Swait et al.
[52] employ one discrete choice experiment (DCE)
concerning hypothetical digital camera profiles to estimate
model parameters, then use a second DCE with real digital
cameras on an independent sample from the same population
to conduct out-of-sample forecasts. They find that the out-of-
sample forecasting of the goal-based model is markedly supe-
rior to a standard latent preference class model. Similarly,
Souza [48] investigates the screening role of (latent) goals in
choice set formation. Following model estimation, he uses
content analysis of user-provided motivations for screening
to validate econometric inferences. Both references illustrate
the usefulness and increased precision of interpretation arising
from a goal-based modeling approach, reinforcing that re-
searchers should plan robust validation exercises as part of
model development and testing. A further application in the
environmental economics area is Thiene et al. [55] who ex-
amine the role of goals in choice set formation. They include
responses tomotivation or goal questions as factors explaining
the probability of inclusion of alternative rock climbing sites
in an independent availability model of choice set formation.
6 Measurement and Estimation
Whereas empirically oriented social scientists in the past had
to make do with scarce databases or engage in costly primary
data gathering, we live today in a golden age of relative data
abundance. Due to the ubiquity of internet-enabled search
(e.g., Google) and procurement (e.g., Amazon)—with
matter-of-course recording of intermediate way stations and
blind alleys—the ability to rigorously model not only eventual
choice but the process of goal attainment has increased
dramatically.
However, voluminous data is not synonymous with ap-
propriate data, and many challenges remain for data col-
lection, measurement, and inference when one wishes to
estimate goal-based models of choice. The standard work-
horse in the field is the discrete choice model, descending
from McFadden’s conditional logit and successively
broadening to full-on Bayesian machinery to capture hi-
erarchical choice processes, systematically and incidental-
ly missing data, and data fusion [15]. But such methods
are not designed to automatically model the intricate,
time-bound processes of goal choice strategies that in-
volve seeking, revising, and evaluating the attainment of
goals (or lack thereof). Here, we consider some exten-
sions, in terms of data requirements and model develop-
ments, towards that end specifically.
Let us consider again our examples in the domains of
marketing, environmental public policy, transport, and the
sociology of mate choice. Although these examples were
chosen to highlight the vast range of goal choice strate-
gies, they share certain features, some of them differen-
tially implicated in goal orientation. Perhaps chief among
these is the notion of constrained optimization: in the
extant canonical choice theory setting, the decision-
maker must maximize outcome utility under a cost (time,
money, cognition) constraint, but in a goal choice setting,
options highly attractive in one goal’s context may be
ruled out by another. For example, in housing search,
the Bperfect home^ may be struck for lacking a good
neighborhood primary school, although one does not yet
have children; a vacation consistent with the goal of
Blifetime learning^ may not score high on Bfun with
friends^; a family car that provides safety and suitable
accoutrements may interfere with savings for children’s
college; or looking for an Bestablished, stable provider^
might translate into their already having had a family with
a prior partner.
In each of these cases, the choices made by the
decision-maker can involve not only the attributes and
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utility weights of others [3] but also the activation of, and
conflict among, multiple goals, some of which are not
traditionally part of the decision domain. For example,
living in a part of the city that enables one to meet a wide
variety of potential mates may entail rental costs that pre-
clude purchasing a car or a home of one’s own. As such,
to calibrate not just models of choice but models of choice
under multiple goal pursuit requires both a re-examination
of constraint-based optimization and the sorts of data that
that would require: how particular decisions not only im-
pact goal attainment but also constrain seemingly unrelat-
ed options down the road for additional goals. Specific
information that could inform a hierarchical setting would
involve geo-demographics, lifestyle stage, financing and
credit score information, as well as Bmarket baskets^ for
both non-durable and durable products. Ideally, such in-
formation would be available for an entire co-habitating
unit, to begin to unravel the multiple goals and constraints
implicated by seemingly Bindividual^ decisions.
To this end, data from a wide variety of choices and inter-
mediate stages of choice would be especially useful: not only
which widget was eventually purchased but also the full act of
widget information search, across providers. To obtain any-
thing like causal statements—e.g., Bshe did that because the
goal of completing her education took precedence over pur-
chasing a car^—researchers would ideally make use not only
of field data but also of field experiments. For example, a web
site offering information on homes for sale might differential-
ly prioritize information pertinent to children (school quality,
proximity to play areas, neighborhood composition, etc.) to
determine how goals related to that affect site usage and even-
tual home choice. If such experiments are coordinated across
providers—not only housing searches but also other informa-
tion or purchase-oriented sites—a unified model of goals
could be formulated from this sort of cross-context,
individual-level data.
Even with such ideal data, the process of measurement is
fraught with complexities. The sheer number of variables and
their interactions would require either highly theory-driven,
Btop-down^ searches for patterns (e.g., Bwe sought three types
of consistent reaction^) or what is essentially the opposite: a
Bbottom-up^ machine-learning or nonparametric approach.
So-called big data would not only enable but also practically
invite the latter, where unsupervised learning could pick out
salient patterns across data types while sidestepping attrition,
missing information, and other distracting arcana of real data
sets. Indeed, such a revolution has begun, with the automated
extraction of marketing Bmeaning^ from large corpora [57]
and the use of high-dimensional nonparametric models to ac-
count for complex nonlinear and non-monotonic data relation-
ships [8]. The use of such methods is presently constrained by
storage, manipulation, and processing constraints, although
recent advances in both classical and Bayesian estimation
[23], as well as the inexorable upward trajectory in computa-
tional speed, will increasingly enable researchers to fashion
flexible models of goal attainment on available, large-scale
data sources.
6.1 Model Identification and a Partial Research Agenda
for Testing the Model
Combining Occam’s razor and the need to search for evidence
in outcome data (choices) brings us to the formulation of a key
research question: When does a goal-based model of choice
behavior provide better predictions of choice behavior than
other (and simpler) models that do not feature a goal layer,
and does the increase in predictive accuracy justify the loss in
tractability?
The latter part of this question is essentially subjective, but
the part preceding is objective in the sense that there are
established procedures for determining the predictive perfor-
mance of a choice model. A goal-based choice model’s poten-
tial to generate better predictions than other models crucially
depends on its ability to make predictions that differ from
those made by other models (in the sense of assigning differ-
ent choice probabilities to alternatives).
This also raises the question: what other models should one
use as benchmark? Even though there are many ways to pe-
nalize model complexity in statistical testing procedures, com-
paring a full-fledged goal-based model with a linear-in-
parameters multinomial logit (MNL) model is not going to
convince many scholars. For example, a choice model with
a flexible error structure and a non-linear specification of ob-
served utility may be a more credible candidate for goal-based
models to be benchmarked against, rather than a simpleMNL.
Combining these lines of argumentation, we suggest that
the following research agenda be followed to arrive at a test of
the added value of the goal-based framework proposed in this
paper:
1. Find or collect data which in theory would allow the re-
searcher to observe differences between the predictions
made by goal-based models and competing choice
models.
2. Specify the appropriate goal-based model, as well as a
range of other candidate models that are likely to do well
on the data; this class of competing models may include
workhorse models such as linear-in-parameter MNL
models, but should also include several more flexible
and sophisticated models.
3. Estimate all models on the collected data and perform
extensive out-of-sample validation tests. These validation
tests can involve prediction of choices, but should also
examine the ability of competing models to predict goals
that subjects explicitly articulate (but are not used in esti-
mation, of course). The objective of these tests should, at
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one level, be about establishing predictive validity, but
this does not preclude examining the external and con-
struct validity of models. Such tests are especially impor-
tant when the goal-based model consumes more degrees
of freedom (parameters) than competitor models.
4. Carefully inspect the differences in predictions between
different models, if necessary at the level of individual
choice situations/tasks. This may warrant the specific de-
sign of validation data collection efforts, separate from
model estimation data. Explore if the goal-based model(s)
differ from other models—in terms of predicted choice
probabilities for particular alternatives—in ways that
align well with the behavioral notions on which the model
is built.
If the choice modeler’s aim is simply to predict choice
behavior, then the abovementioned steps—preferably per-
formed on a large number of data sets by different teams
of researchers—should suffice as a test of the potential of
the goal-based approach. If one, in addition, has the am-
bition to derive managerial or policy implications, then a
next step is to explore to what extent the goal-based ap-
proachmay be translated intomanagerial or policy actions
that differ from those generated by competitor models.
And, ultimately, the desire is to construct a better under-
standing of the behavioral underpinnings of choice along
with predictive ability.
7 Discussion
Currently popular models of choice behavior are econo-
metrically quite sophisticated compared to the workhorse
linear-in-parameters MNL models of the 1970s. Driven by
scholars’ ambitions to explain ever more subtle (latent)
behavioral phenomena and aided by phenomenal ad-
vances in computational power, the choice modeler’s tool-
box has over the years been enriched with a wide variety
of alternative model specifications. Initially, developments
focused on incorporating more sophisticated error term
structures to more closely represent observed substitution
patterns, but more recently, doubtlessly inspired by the
growing exploration of the judgment and decision theory
literature and the increased popularity of behavioral eco-
nomics, attention has shifted towards incorporating psy-
chological insights in choice models.
In many instances, choice modelers with an interest in the
behavioral sciences point at the often compelling intuitions
underlying Bbehaviorally realistic^ choice models. However,
these intuitions (e.g., that people use higher-level goals when
trading off attributes of choice alternatives) usually refer to the
process of decision-making, while the data used to validate
models tends to consist of decision outcomes (i.e., choices).
What is more, process data, such as verbal reports on mental
processes or activated neurons in the case of fMRI studies,
have been criticized for being unreliable.
This may require a Milton Friedman style Bas if^ concep-
tualization: since we are unable to rigorously verify the pro-
cess assumptions underlying our model (i.e., the role of high-
level goals), we are forced to search for proof in observed
choices. This challenge is not dissimilar to the early discussion
in economics of the movement from demand for Bgoods^
versus demand for attributes. Before Lancaster [29], there
was not much discussion on the topic of attributes (at least
in economics). It took a significant amount of time, and a
different approach to data collection and analysis, before
attribute-based approaches were fully employed in the litera-
ture. Another example of such shifts in approach is reference
dependence: structural models embodying the concept have
only appeared fairly recently, even though reduced form
models that included reference dependence clearly worked
better at predicting individual choice. Goals may present dif-
ficulties because they are generally unobservable, but that is
also the case with reference dependence. The observer does
not really know what people deem the reference condition to
be, and it may not be the current state (the usual assumption
made in analysis).
In Fig. 1, the double-headed arrow between the goal acti-
vation block and the goal-space representation is meant to
convey the idea that the inability to attain one or more goals
at a satisfactory level can lead to goal importance adaptation
as well as (de)activation of other goals [33, 52]. Another way
to state this is that people adapt to the decision context in part
by changing their goal pursuit behavior if their desired goals
are not attainable, perhaps to the point of deactivating some
goals and activating others.
Readers will have noticed there has been little mention of
the income or budget constraint (though see discussion fol-
lowing expression (2)). The traditional place to incorporate the
income constraint is in attribute space, much in the form
shown for constraint H1 (see Fig. 1 again). From a process
perspective, however, it seems to us that an alternative repre-
sentation is that the budget and other exogenous constraints
can be conceptualized following the selection of the preferred
alternative(s) in goal space by checking for the budgetary
impact of the choice(s) determined through goal pursuit. If
the budget constraint is met, the decision-maker can move to
implementation; however, if the budget constraint is violated
by the desired outcome, it is necessary to return to earlier
stages and implement constraints in attribute space or revise
goal activations and importance so as to determine a final,
feasible choice. An alternative depiction is that such con-
straints may be at work in the goal (de)activation stage (reduc-
tion of Γ to ΓA), dictating which goals should be pursued and
what importance should be assigned to them. Interesting pos-
sibilities arise from this second conceptualization: e.g., if
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someone projects that a budget constraint cannot be met for
one goal if another is achieved (I may not be able to afford a
car if I take a year off to travel to learn about shamanic tradi-
tions along the Silk Road, or I may not be able to support my
family if I pursue my dream of being an artist), they may not
activate certain goals. And as mentioned above, budget infor-
mation may enter in the construction of process-based goals.
The important issues here center on the stochasticity and fu-
ture orientation of the activated goals under the influence of
budget constraints.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have outlined key components of multi-
ple, simultaneous goal pursuit and multi-stage choice, and
have proposed how individuals’ use of multiple goals can
be incorporated in econometric models of individual de-
cision-making. Since different goals are often only partial-
ly compatible, a multiple goal-based approach implies
balancing goal leading to a deliberate goal-level choice
strategy on the part of the decision-maker. Therefore, we
introduced a conceptual framework that classified differ-
ent aspects of individuals’ decisions in the presence of
multiple goals (Fig. 1). At the core of the proposed frame-
work is the distinction between decision-makers’ goal
choice strategy (i.e., the individual’s choice of establish-
ing the role of goals, singly and in interaction; see [35])
and their goal evaluation strategy (i.e., a function of some
or all of the attributes that affect the achievement of alter-
natives on a goal). The goal choice strategy is of prime
importance in the proposed framework because it reflects
the fact that the decision-maker’s choice may ultimately
be determined in goal space, not attribute space, as is
more commonly represented. In that case, the goal evalu-
ation strategy does not affect the choice directly but de-
termines how well alternatives perform on each of the
different goals. Thus, by discussing the main components
as well as identification and modeling needs for the pro-
posed goal-based choice strategies, we hope the current
paper can stimulate further empirical research on the the-
oretically promising as well as practically relevant topic
of individuals’ choices in the presence of multiple goals.
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